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CIVIL RIGHTS WITHOUT REMEDIES:




The Supreme Court has taken an inconsistent approach to allowing vicarious
liability under major civil rights statutes. In recent cases, the Court has permitted
qualified vicarious liability for supervisors'sexual harassment under Title VII, but
rejected vicarious liability under Title IX. Earlier, the Court rejected vicarious
liability for local governments sued under Section 1983. In this Article, Professors
Fisk and Chemerinsky describe the Court's inconsistent approaches and argue that
they cannot bejustfied by the text or legislative history of these statutes. Professors
Fisk and Chemerinsky argue that each of these statutes is meant to achieve the same
purpose, deterring civil rights violations liability advances these goals, and that the
Court, therefore, should interpret each of these important civil rights statutes to
allow such liability.
INTRODUCTION
There is no single, omnibus civil rights statute in the United States. Rather, over
the course of a century, Congress has enacted many different laws to protect specific
aspects of civil rights from infringement. Section 1983,' for example, was enacted
in 187 1, as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act, to deal with racial violence in southern
" Professor of Law and William Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
Sidney M. Irmas Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Southern
California.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit-in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
Id.
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states.2 The 1964 Civil Rights Act3 contains many crucial provisions prohibiting
discrimination, including Title II, which prohibits discrimination by places of public
accommodation;4 Title VI, which limits discrimination by recipients of federal
funds;5 and Title VII, which prohibits discrimination in employment based on race,
national origin, gender, or religion." Title IX subsequently amended Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act to prohibit gender discrimination by recipients of federal
funds.7 Many other federal civil rights laws exist, including the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act ("ADEA")' and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA").9
All of these laws share a key feature in common: they create civil liability for
civil rights violations.'0 Each law imposes civil liability so as to deter wrongs and
compensate injured individuals. Indeed, .the United States Supreme Court has
recognized expressly that each of these laws serves the twin goals of deterrence and
compensation. 1
2 See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978). For other
discussion by the Supreme Court of the historical background of Section 1983, see also Patsy
v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 503 (1982) (stating that Section 1983 was
enacted to prevent states from depriving citizens of their federal rights); Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 98 (1980) (stating that the goal of Section 1983 was to counter the influence of
the Ku Klux Klan over state governments); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972)
(stating that the purpose of Section 1983 was to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment);
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961) (stating that Section 1983 was enacted to
provide a federal remedy for civil rights violations perpetrated by the states).
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000aetseq. (1994).
4 See id, § 2000a.
I See id. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4. Title VI provides: "No person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." Id § 2000d.
6 See id §§ 2000e to 2000e-5. See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30
(1971) (stating that the purpose of Title VII was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities).
7 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). Title IX was added to the civil rights laws as part of the
package of amendments known as the Education Amendments of 1972. Congress thought
that the omission of sex from the list of protected traits covered under Title VI, which
prohibits race discrimination by recipients of federal funds, resulted in unacceptable sex
discrimination by certain educational institutions. Accordingly, Title IX, which is modeled
closely on Title VI, prohibits sex discrimination by educational programs that receive federal
funds. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-95 n. 16 (1979) (detailing the
legislative history of Title IX).
8 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
'0 A private right of action is available under Title VI. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 594-95, cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1228 (1983).
" For example, the Court has stated expressly that Section 1983 goals are deterrence and
risk spreading. See Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
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As a result of the civil liability established, a common issue has arisen: whether
employers should be vicariously liable when employees are found to violate the civil
rights laws. The question seems identical for each law. Vicarious liability, often
called respondeat superior liability, advances the goals of the civil rights laws.
Employer liability deters wrongdoing because it provides an incentive to control
employee behavior and to prevent violations. 2 This deterrence is the standard
rationale for vicarious liability throughout tort law.'3 Moreover, vicarious liability
helps to ensure compensation for injured victims of civil rights violations. An
individual employee rarely will be able to pay significant damages; the deeper pocket
of the employer greatly increases the likelihood that judgments will be paid.
Although the basic issue of vicarious liability is the same under each of these
civil rights laws, the Court has, for the most part, rejected vicarious liability and has
created several different rules for employer liability. In 1978, the Supreme Court
rejected respondeat superior liability under Section 1983 and held that
governments-the only possible entity defendant under the law' 4-- are liable only for
violations resulting from their own policies and customs. 5 In other words, cities are
liable only on the basis of the fault of high-level policymaking officials. In contrast,
last Term, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth6 and Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton,17 the Supreme Court approved vicarious liability for employers under Title
VII for sexual harassment by supervisors.' In these holdings, the Court qualified the
vicarious liability rule by allowing an employer to prove, by affirmative defense, that
it was not at fault when the harassment was unaccompanied by an employment action
12 See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69,
at 500-01 (5th ed. 1984); Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An
Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 10 1
HARV. L. REV. 563, 569-70 (1988); J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment
Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 273, 308-15 (1995); Kathleen A. Smith, Note, Employer
Liability for Sexual Harassment: Inconsistency Under Title VII, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 245,
259-61 (1987).
13 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 69, at 500-01; John Dwight Ingram, Vicarious
Liability of an Employer-Master: Must There Be a Right of Control?, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
93, 93 (1995); see also infra text accompanying notes 24-41.
"4 Private entities, therefore, are not liable under Section 1983. Section 1983 applies
when an action is under the color of law. The Supreme Court declared in United States v.
Price: "In cases under § 1983, 'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the same
thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment." United States v. Price,
383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989), the Court held that state governments cannot be sued under Section 1983 because
they are not persons under that statute.
"s See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
16 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
'7 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
's See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
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such as a hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, or transfer. 9 However, in another
decision last Term, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,20 the Court
rejected vicarious liability for sexual harassment under Title IX.2 In that case, the
Court concluded that employers may be found liable under Title IX only if they have
actual knowledge of sexual harassment by employees and are deliberately indifferent
to such harassment.22
This Article examines the puzzle of the inconsistency of these cases. What, if
anything, explains why vicarious liability is allowed under some civil rights laws and
not others? Each of these statutes is silent about this question. None has a legislative
history addressing the issue. The thesis of this Article is that the inconsistency is a
result of a misguided approach to statutory interpretation. In each area, the Court
looked for some aspect of the statute's language or legislative background to decide
the issue of vicarious liability. The preferable approach would have been for the
Court to have undertaken a purposive analysis, considering whether vicarious liability-
best achieved the central goals of the legislation. From this perspective, the Court
should have found in favor of vicarious liability under all of these statutes.23
Part I of this Article describes the Court's inconsistent approach to vicarious
liability in civil rights cases. Part II discusses why vicarious liability should exist in
civil rights cases and why a better approach to statutory interpretation supports this
result for each of these laws. Finally, Part III considers the implications of our
analysis for other areas of civil rights litigation.
Employer liability is enormously important in civil rights litigation. Often it will
mean the difference between an injured plaintiff receiving compensation and getting
nothing and between employers preventing civil rights violations and ignoring them.
By limiting employer liability to cases in which high-level officials of the defendant
city, school district, or employer knew of the civil rights violation (under Title IX)
or knew or should have known (under Title VII), the Court has created a whole class
of civil rights violations for which there will be no remedy. The fault-based standard
long has vexed practice under Section 1983. The new adoption of a fault-based
standard for Title IX and Title VII cases is likely to cause problems. Rather than
moving Title VII and Title IX law in the direction of Section 1983, the Court should
move Section 1983 and Title IX to the strict employer liability standard that courts
applied in Title VII cases before the sexual harassment cause of action and the
availability of punitive damages led some courts to conclude that employers should
not be held automatically liable for workplace discrimination.
"9 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
20 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
21 See id. at 1993.
22 See id. at 2000.
23 The focus of this Article is on three statutes: Section 1983, Title VII, and Title IX.
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I. THE SUPREME COURT HAS BEEN INCONSISTENT IN ITS APPROACH TO
VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
A. Vicarious Liability in Torts and Civil Rights Cases Compared
Violations of federal civil rights laws are akin to torts. The civil rights statutes
impose duties and provide causes of action for damages resulting from conduct that
breaches a duty. Like tort law, the civil rights laws must determine the circumstances
in which employers may be held liable for the wrongful conduct of its employees.
The Supreme Court has taken three different approaches to employer liability under
each of these statutes and has made employer liability much harder to establish in
civil rights cases than it is under the law of agency used in tort cases. The Court's
inconsistent methods of analysis and rules of employer liability have engendered
confusion and unnecessary litigation and have thwarted enforcement of civil rights
policies.
Employer liability is a problem in any cause of action that creates liability of an
entity because the entity-defendant is not a living person and it does not act except
through the living persons who work for it. The civil rights statutes at issue here
speak, by and large, in terms of preventing discrimination by employers or entities
that receive federal funds. Although Section 1983 speaks in terms of "persons,"
when the Supreme Court construed the term "person" to encompass a municipality,24
the same problem resulted.
In assessing employer liability, it is important to distinguish between direct and
vicarious liability. Direct employer liability is premised on the employer's own
conduct: its condoning or failing to prevent the wrongful conduct of its employees
or its negligent hiring or retaining of the tortfeasor employee(s).25 The employer's
liability for the conduct of the employee is based on the employer having breached
a duty of care in the way it hired, trained, or supervised the tortfeasor employee(s).
The employer's breach of this duty of care must have caused the harm to the plaintiff.
In vicarious liability cases, the focus is not on whether the employer breached a
duty of care by something it did or failed to do. Rather, the focus is on the
relationship between the tortfeasor employee(s) and the employer; usually, the issue
is whether the employee was acting "within the scope of employment" at the time the
tort was committed.26 The employer's liability is vicarious in that the employer is
liable for the wrongful conduct simply because the tortfeasor was its employee acting
24 See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
25 See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213(b) (1959) (stating thafthe principal
is liable for its own negligence in employment of "improper persons or instrumentalities in
work involving risk of harm to others"); id. § 219(2)(b) (stating that the master is liable for
torts of its servants when "the master [is] negligent or reckless").
26 See id. § 219(l)(b).
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within the scope of employment. This concept also is known as respondeat superior
liability.
Employer liability in torts sometimes is premised on an "alter ego" notion. Some
employees are placed so highly in the firm that their actions are deemed by the law
to be actions of the firm, which usually is a corporation and, thus, can "act" itself
only through the behavior of its high-level employees, officers, or directors."
To ensure adequate compensation of tort victims and to deter negligent and
intentionally harmful conduct, the law of torts generously imposes vicarious liability
when an employee injures a fellow employee or a third party.2" Employers are liable
under modem tort law for an employee's intentional tort that clearly is contrary to
employer policy, and are liable even when the employee is not motivated by the
purpose of serving the employer.29
The wide scope of employer liability for employee conduct is reflected in the
Restatement (Second) of Agency.3" Section 219 of the Restatement lists six
circumstances in which employers are liable for torts committed by their employees.3
According to the Restatement, the employer is liable when (1) the employee acts
within the scope of his or her employment;32 (2) the employer intended the conduct
or consequences;33 (3) the employer was negligent or reckless;34 (4) the conduct
violated a nondelegable duty of the employer;35 (5) the employee purported to act or
speak on behalf of the employer and the victim relied on that apparent authority;
36
27 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2267 (1998).
28 See Sykes, supra, note 12, at 589 (providing precedential examples of the imposition
of vicarious liability on employers for injury caused by employees to other employees or
third parties).
29 See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VILiability
of Embloyers For Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
66, 89-90 (1995) (citing Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 733 (1995); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir.
1991); Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 471-72, 482 (5th Cir. 1989)
(parentheticals omitted) (noting the shift from the serving the master rule to a rule of
foreseeability)); Sykes, supra note 12, at 589 (citing the same sources as Oppenheimer,
supra); Verkerke, supra note 12, at 291 ("Many jurisdictions ... have abrogated the business
purpose test in favor of a more inclusive standard based on concepts of foreseeability and
causation. This competing version of respondeat superior doctrine supports strict employer
liability for all discriminatory conduct in the workplace." (footnote omitted)).
30 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1959).
3" See id.
32 See id. § 219(1).
3 See id § 219(2)(a).
, See id. § 219(2)(b).
3 See id. § 219(2)(c).
36 See id. § 219(2)(d).
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and (6) the employee was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation."
The trend in tort law has been to expand the scope of employers' vicarious
liability." Vicarious liability is justified by the need to ensure adequate
compensation for tort victims, to provide incentives for employers to control
employees, and to spread the cost of harmful conduct to consumers and other
employees.39
The rules for employer liability in civil rights cases are radically different from
those in tort cases. Under Title VII, the Supreme Court and lower courts have begun
to require proof of employer fault as a basis for liability in many harassment cases,
although employers are held vicariously liable for discriminatory hiring, firing,
promotion, and demotion decisions regardless of fault. Under Section 1983, the
Supreme Court has insisted upon proof of employer fault as the only basis for
employer liability ° and, under Title IX, the standard is actual notice plus deliberate
indifference."'
The result that employer liability should be much harder to establish in civil
rights cases than it is in tort cases is wrong as a matter of policy. The traditional
policies underpinning broad vicarious liability in torts-compensation and
deterrence-also call for broad liability in civil rights cases. Moreover, there is no
reason, based on policy, statutory language, or legislative intent, to have three
different standards for employer liability under Title VII, Title IX, and Section 1983.
31 See id In addition, section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes on
employers the duty to exercise reasonable care in controlling employees outside the scope
of employment to prevent the employees from intentionally harming others, provided that the
employee is on the employer's premises or using the employer's property. See 2
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965).
Similar vicarious liability rules apply when an employee injures a fellow employee (the
tort analog to Title VII) as when the employee injures a third party (the usual tort analog of
Title IX and Section 1983). The branch of tort law dealing with coworker harms has been
subsumed by workers' compensation law which is the exclusive remedy for an employee
injured at work by another employee. In most states, workers' compensation laws have
provided an expansive notion of vicarious employer liability for harms employees inflict
upon one another. See I ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW § 4.30 (1998).
38 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 69, at 500-01.
19 See 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.5, at 21 (2d ed. 1986);
KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 69, at 500-01; Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 90-91.
40 See infra text accompanying notes 125-60.
41 See infra text accompanying notes 161-88.
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B. Vicarious Liability in Title VII
Title VII prohibits discrimination by an employer or its agents42 in the terms or
conditions of employment on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or
sex.43 Though the statute defines covered employers to include any "agent" of the
employer,44 the statute does not address vicarious liability. 45 That omission is not
surprising when one considers that the kind of discrimination Congress had in mind
when it enacted Title VII would, without doubt, form the basis of employer liability.
When the employer entity has a practice of discrimination in hiring, firing,
promotion, or demotion, or in establishing pay scales, assignments, orjob categories,
such discrimination is attributable to the employer under any theory of agency. This
is true even if "the employer" (a corporation or its officers or directors) has policies
explicitly forbidding discrimination in employment.46 Because such practices were
the paradigmatic form of discrimination prior to 1964, Congress simply did not
anticipate employer liability would be a big problem, and in many Title VII cases it
has not been one.
The development of a Title VII cause of action for sexual harassment, however,
as well as the availability of compensatory and punitive damages under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, have made employer liability a very big problem. Employers
began to persuade courts that the bias of their managers and employees-whether in
harassment cases or in individual disparate treatment hiring, promotion, or firing
cases-was not the bias "of the employer" but simply the private views of an errant
bad actor for which the firm could not be held liable. Many courts thus held that,
unless high-level officials of the firms knew or should have known of the
discriminatory conduct and failed to take reasonable action, firms were not liable to
victims of sexual harassment.4 7 A few courts even held that employers were not
liable in hiring/firing/promotion cases for compensatory or punitive damages without
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994).
" See id. § 2000e-2.
14 See id. § 2000e(b).
4" See infra notes 189-211 and accompanying text.
46 See, e.g., Quinones v. City of Evanston, 58 F.3d 275, 278 (7th Cir. 1995) ("If some
rogue supervisor refuses to hire persons protected by the ADEA, or gives them lower
salaries, the municipality-the employer under the Act-is liable even if the supervisor acted
in the teeth of the city's policy."); cf KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, at 502 ("A master cannot
escape liability [for his servant's torts] merely by ordering his servant to act carefully. If he
could, no doubt few employers would ever be held liable.").
47 See, e.g., BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
EMPLOYMENTLAW 226,231,241-42(1992); id. at 62-68 (Supp. 1997); Oppenheimer, supra
note 29, at 66 (citing Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 733 (1995); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991);
Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 471-72, 482 (5th Cir. 1989)
(parentheticals omitted)).
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proof that the biased decision-maker was a high-level official." This view is not
without some support in the law of agency in tort cases. The employer in some
jurisdictions is not liable for the torts of its employees motivated by personal
concerns rather than some desire to serve the employer. Although some individual
discrimination might be motivated by a desire, albeit misguided, to serve the
employer (such as hiring only men in the belief that they are more competent), other
incidents might be motivated only by jealousy or personal animosity (e.g., "the new
management resented her [the most successful life insurance agent in the office] for
being a successful woman and set out to undermine her, humiliating her personally
with sexist remarks and crude sexual advances," which cost the company substantial
loss of business).49
This new rule carved a hole in Title VII's protections. Because most courts have
rejected individual liability under Title VII (as well as under the ADEA and the
48 See, for example, Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927, 944 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 767 (1997), in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
declined to hold an employer liable for punitive damages for intentional discrimination by
a manager (the plaintiff's supervisor) because the manager was not a "corporate officer." In
light of the recent Faragher and Ellerth decisions, the Fifth Circuit modified the rule
established in Patterson by allowing punitive damages against employers in hiring/firing
cases when the person who discriminatorily hired or fired had the authority to do so. See
Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 593 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated
and reh'g en banc granted, No. 97-10685, 1999 WL 107104 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 1999); cf
Willis v. Marion County Auditor's Office, 118 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that
the decision-maker, as opposed to the subordinates, must harbor a desire to terminate an
employee for engaging in protected activity or due to general racial animus for liability to
accrue); Dennis v. County of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that the county
remedied allegedly discriminatory unfair discipline by taking prompt corrective action);
Wilson v. Stroh Co., 952 F.2d 942, 952 (6th Cir. 1992) (questioning whether the
discriminatory remarks or desires of intermediate-level supervisors is sufficient to establish
a prima facie case of discrimination when the decision to terminate is made by an upper-level
official); Montgomery v. Campbell Soup Co., 647 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (N.D. Iil. 1986)
(holding that to establish a case of discrimination, someone at the decision-making level in
the corporate hierarchy must have committed the wrong). Some courts of appeals rejected
the argument that district courts had accepted. Some held that, as long as the decision-maker
was biased, the bias would be imputed to the employer and the employer would be liable both
for back pay and for punitive damages. See Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d
1089, 1100 n.12 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the bias of"second level manager" who was the
final decision-maker on the selection of people for termination is imputed to the company
both for the purpose of determining whether the ADEA was violated and for the purpose of
determining liability for double damages for willful violation); Levendos v. Stem
Entertainment, Inc., 909 F.2d 747, 751 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding restaurant employer liable for
sex discrimination toward female maitre d' by general manager and chef because they were
agents of the employer).
"9 Durham Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, Nos. 97-1683, 97-1712, 1999 WL 16779, at *43 (3d
Cir. Jan. 15, 1999).
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ADA),5" if the employer is not liable for the employee's conduct in harassment cases,
there is no Title VII liability at all, no matter how egregious the discriminatory
behavior. If courts were to accept the same limits on vicarious liability in
hiring/firing cases that they have accepted in hostile environment sexual harassment
cases, firms presumably still would be held vicariously liable for back pay, but no
punitive damages would be awarded unless the plaintiff could prove bias on the part
of the corporate officers, in addition to bias on the part of the person who did the
discriminatory hiring or firing.
The Supreme Court first addressed vicarious liability for supervisor harassment
in Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson.5" The Court devoted most of its opinion to
the issue of whether the conduct constituted sex discrimination actionable under Title
VII.52 Having determined that it was actionable sex discrimination, the Court left to
the lower court to decide whether the employer would be held liable for the
harassment.53 Part of the problem in Vinson was that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") appeared to present two conflicting positions
on employer liability. The EEOC Guidelines to Title VII provided for strict
employer liability for all supervisory harassment, whether or not it was accompanied
by adverse job action. But the EEOC took a more employer-friendly position in the
litigation, arguing that employers should be strictly liable only for supervisory quid
pro quo harassment, and that employer liability for supervisory hostile environment
harassment should depend on whether the employer had an adequate complaint
procedure and whether the plaintiff unreasonably failed to use this procedure. Noting
that the EEOC's two positions were "in some tension," the Court declined "to issue
a definitive rule on employer liability," and simply instructed the lower court on
remand to use traditional principles of agency law.54 In Meritor, the Court rejected,
50 See, e.g., Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400,404-05 (6th Cir. 1997); Haynes
v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 901 (10th Cir. 1996); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
100 F.3d 1061, 1078 (3d Cir. 1996); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 (11 th Cir. 1995);
Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1011 (1995); Tomka
v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-14 (2d Cir. 1995); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552,
554 (7th Cir. 1995); Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir. 1994);
Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 651-53 (5th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, 991
F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109 (1994) (imposing no
individual liability under Title VII or the ADEA). See generally Rebecca Hanner White,
Vicarious and Personal Liability for Employment Discrimination, 30 GA. L. REV. 509, 529-
30 (1996) (arguing that the employer should be held vicariously liable for hostile work
environments when a supervisory employee discriminates against subordinates and that
making individuals liable ultimately would undermine the enforcement of the statutes).
s' 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
52 See id. at 63-69.
3 See id. at 73.
14 Id. at 71-72.
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however, the possibility that employers are "always automatically liable for sexual
harassment by their supervisors."55
After Meritor, lower courts reached a general consensus that employers would
be liable for harassment by coworkers only if there was direct liability, which means
they would be liable only for their own fault in failing to prevent or remedy
harassment.56 Except when the harassment involved actual adverse employment
action, for which the firm would be liable under the "alter ego" theory, employers
persuaded many courts that sexual harassment by a supervisor was akin to a tort
committed outside an employee's scope of employment because the harassment was
not part of the employee's job description, was prohibited by employer policy, and
was motivated by the harasser's sexual desire or misogyny.57 In other words,
employers were vicariously liable for supervisory harassment that was a "quid pro
quo" for keeping or getting ajob benefit, but not for harassment that simply created
a hostile workplace environment. Furthermore, although courts held employers
vicariously liable when the supervisory harassment involved an actual adverse
employment decision,58 it was unclear whether a threatened job action was enough
to establish vicarious liability if the threat was never carried out. 9 In other words,
courts were confused as to whether a threatened quid pro quo should be treated as
such, or whether it should be treated as creating a hostile environment, for which
most courts held the employer liable only for its own negligence in failing to prevent,
Id. at 72.
56 See, e.g., Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 804 (6th Cir. 1994); 1
BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 811-12,
822-24 (citations omitted).
" See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2287 (1998) (citations omitted)
(stating that sexual harassment creating a hostile environment is outside the scope of
employment of supervisors); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1398 (D.C. Cir.) (finding that
employer's policy prohibited harassment), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1011 (1995); Hirschfeld
v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that sexual
harassment is not part of the job description); see also LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note
56, at 812 (stating that "[h]ostile environment sexual harassment normally does not trigger
respondeat superior liability because sexual harassment rarely, if ever, is among the official
duties of a supervisor" (citing Parks v. Hawyard's Pit, No. 93-2387-JWL, 1993 WL 545231,
at * I (D. Kan. 1993); Salley v. Petrolane, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 61, 63 (W.D.N.C. 1991)); and
noting that most courts have determined that employers are liable for hostile environment
harassment by supervisors only on the basis of negligence).
" See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2264-65 (1998) (citing Davis
v. Sioux City, 115 F.3d 1365, 1367 (8th Cir. 1997); Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29
F.3d 103, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1994); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 513-14 (9th Cir. 1994);
Sauers v. Salt Lake County, I F.3d 1122, 1127 (10th Cir. 1993); Kauffman v. Allied Signal,
Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 185-86 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1041 (1992); Steele v. Offshore
Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1316 (1 th Cir. 1989)).
"' See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2265.
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stop, or remedy the action.6" Law review literature has been critical both of the strict
limits on employer liability and of the confusion about when vicarious liability would
be found and when it would not.61
The Supreme Court attempted to resolve confusion about employer liability for
supervisory harassment in two cases from the 1997-1998 Term: Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton62 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.63 In both cases, the Court
held that the employers were vicariously liable for supervisory harassment that
involved an adverse job action.64 Thus, the employers were found liable for
supervisory harassment unaccompanied by adverse employment action only on the
basis of fault (i.e., direct liability). Although the burden of proving the absence of
employer fault is on the employer, it nevertheless is a fault-based standard.
The facts of both Faragher and Ellerth involved employees who were harassed
by their mid-level supervisors. Faragher was a lifeguard employed by the Marine
Safety Division of the Department of Parks and Recreation of the city of Boca
Raton.66 Faragher asserted that her supervisors, the chief of the Marine Safety
Division and his subordinate, a Marine Safety lieutenant, repeatedly harassed her.67
Although she complained to another lifeguard supervisor at the beach, she never
complained to any officials outside the Marine Safety Division.68 Thus, the city
claimed that no city officials higher than the relatively low-level lifeguard supervisors
knew of the harassment.69 Arguing that the city should be liable under Title VII for
the harassment only for its own fault (that is, if it knew or should have known of the
harassment, and failed to stop or remedy it), the city contended that the plaintiff's
60 See Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 803 (6th Cir. 1994).
6! See, e.g., Maria M. Carrillo, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor
Under Title VII. Reassessment of Employer Liability in Light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 41, 84-92 (1992-1993); Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 92-
94; Smith, supra note 12, at 259-61; Glen Allen Staszewski, Using Agency Principles for
Guidance in Finding Employer Liability for a Supervisor's Hostile Work Environment
Sexual Harassment, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1057, 1100-04 (1995); Henry P. Ting, Who's the
Boss?: Personal Liability Under Title VII and the ADEA, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 515,
548 (1996); White, supra note 50, at 543-45; Rachel E. Lutner, Note, Employer Liability for
Sexual Harassment: The Morass ofAgency Principles and Respondeat Superior, 1993 U.
ILL. L. REv. 589, 609-12 (1993).
62 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
63 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
4 See id. at 2268; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2284. One could debate whether such action
by the supervisor is vicarious or "alter ego" liability, but the important point is that employer
liability is automatic.
65 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2262; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2280.
66 See Faragher, 18 S. Ct. at 2280.
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failure to complain to high-level city officials precluded liability."0 Similarly, Ellerth
was a salesperson in one of Burlington's divisions in Chicago.7 She was harassed
by her boss' supervisor, who worked in New York.72 Although Ellerth knew that
Burlington had a policy against sexual harassment, she did not inform anyone of the
harassment.73
In both Ellerth and Faragher, the Court based its conclusions about vicarious
liability partly on the language of Title VII. 74 The Court said in Meritor,75 and
reiterated in Ellerth, that the definiti6n of "employer" to include an "agent" of the
employer represented Congress' decision that the common law of agency should
govern vicarious liability for sexual harassment.76 The Court then analyzed the
various provisions of section 219 of the Restatement (Second) ofAgency to determine
when, under its definition of agency, an employer is vicariously liable for sexual
harassment by supervisors.77
The Court began its analysis in Ellerth by deciding that the scope of employment
concept of section 219(1) means acting with a purpose to serve the master. 7' Because
an employee seldom is motivated to harass a subordinate or co-employee sexually for
the purpose of serving the employer, the Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Kennedy, concluded that "[t]he general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor
is not conduct within the scope of employment.,
79
Justice Souter's opinion for the Court in Faragher took a different approach to
this point.8" Justice Souter at least acknowledged that the vicarious liability rules that
have evolved in tort cases are broader than the vicarious liability rule the Court
adopted for sexual harassment under Title VII, and he attempted to justify the
difference." He began by noting that, in Meritor, the Court rejected "automatic
liability" for supervisory harassment.8 2 Justice Souter invoked the importance of
stare decisis as a justification for adhering to that aspect of Meritor, even though the
rest of his analysis pointed toward vicarious liability. 3 He then analyzed three bases
70 See id. at 2290.
7' See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2262 (1998).
72 See id
71 See id.
71 See id. at 2264; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2283.
71 See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
76 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2265.
77 See id. at 2266-68.
78 See id at 2266.
79 Id. at 2267.
80 See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2286-88.
8i See id. at 2286-87.
82 See id at 2285.
83 See id. at 2286.
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for vicarious liability based upon supervisory harassment." The first is the scope of
employment rule of Restatement section 219(l).8" Outside the area of sexual
harassment, Justice Souter noted, courts have found all sorts of outrageous employee
misconduct to be within the scope of employment-the drunken sailor who
inexplicably opened a valve on his ship in dry dock, causing a flood and damaging
both the ship and the dry dock; employees injured in scuffles with coworkers; and the
many employees who have raped customers, clients, or members of the public-all
of these were acting within the scope of employment. 6 Noting that federal courts
have concluded that sexual harassers acted outside the scope of employment,87 Justice
Souter remarked: "An assignment to reconcile the run of the Title VII cases with
those just cited would be a taxing one."88 He rejected the notion that sexually
harassing employees act within the scope of employment not because it is a well-
established tort principle, as Justice Kennedy suggested in Ellerth, but because it
would provide for employer liability in too many circumstances.8 9
This aspect of the opinion is puzzling because the bulk of the Court's analysis
points to the opposite conclusion than the Court ultimately reached. The rest of the
opinion does little to solve the puzzle. "The proper analysis," the Court admonished,
"calls not for a mechanical application of indefinite and malleable factors set forth
in the Restatement,... but rather an inquiry into the reasons that would support a
conclusion that harassing behavior ought to be held within the scope of a supervisor's
employment, and the reasons for the opposite view."' Justice Souter then identified
reasons for holding employers liable for all supervisory harassment. First, "'[t]he
supervisor directs and controls the conduct of the employees, and the manner of
doing so may inure to the employer's benefit or detriment."' 9 Second, harassment
is both foreseeable and a cost of doing business "to be charged to the enterprise
rather than the victim."92 But the opinion offered no response to either of these
arguments.
84 See id. at 2286-93.
85 See id. at 2286.
86 See id at 2287.
87 Some courts did conclude that supervisors acted within the scope of employment, even
when they engaged in outrageous conduct specifically prohibited by employer policy, such
as sexual assault in the workplace. See Martin v. Cavalier Hotel Corp., 48 F.3d 1343, 1352
(4th Cir. 1995).
88 Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2287.
89 See id. at 2288.
90 Id. (citations omitted).
" Id. (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d 1531, 1542 (1997) (Barkett, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
92 Id.
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Justice Souter then suggested two reasons to find that the harassment was not
within the scope of employment.93 First, he saw no reason to suppose that Congress
intended to use the more liberal modem approach to scope of employment, rather
than the older rule which held most forms of misconduct to be outside of the scope
of employment.94 Second, the policies of foreseeability and internalizing costs of
business favoring a determination that supervisory harassment is within the scope of
employment point equally toward respondeat superior liability for co-employee
harassment.95
Both of these arguments are weak. As to the first, Justice Souter suggested no
reason why Congress did not intend courts to use the modern rule of employer
liability for employee wrongdoing. At the time Congress enacted Title VII, the broad
rule of employer liability for employee torts was well-established. Ordinary
principles of statutory construction would lead to the conclusion that Congress
intended Title VII principles of employer liability to reflect those in other areas of
law. Given the remedial purposes of Title VII, there is no reason to believe that
Congress would have chosen an outdated rule of limited employer liability that would
restrict enforcement of the civil rights laws.
The Court's approach to the second argument for limiting employer
liability-that lower courts had rejected vicarious liability for coworker
harassment-also is unpersuasive. The Court did little more than note the unanimity
of the lower courts.' As the Court noted, however, this unanimous view is squarely
at odds with well-established tort rules. 97 Moreover, the unanimity of a view is not
by itself a justification for it. The Court noted elsewhere in its opinion that
employers have more opportunity to scrutinize, monitor, and train supervisors than
nonsupervisory employees; 9 but this is not necessarily true and, in any event, is a
weak justification for refusing to hold employers liable for all supervisory
harassment.
Having rejected the possibility that sexual harassment falls within the scope of
employment and, thus, that the employer would be liable under subsection (1) of
section 219 of the Restatement (Second) ofAgency, the Court's opinions in Ellerth
and Faragher analyzed the various provisions of the second subsection of section
219.'9 The first of these is subsection (2)(a). ° In Ellerth, Justice Kennedy
determined that an employer is liable under section 219(2)(a) only when the harasser
9' See id. at 2288.
9' See id. at 2288-89.
9' See id. at 2289.
96 See id.
97 See id. at 2287.
98 See id. at 2291.
" See id. at 2290-91; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2267 (1998).
'o) See I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(a) (1959) (stating that "the master
intended the conduct or the consequences").
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is such a high-ranking person that his actions-whatever they are-can be deemed
to be acts-of the employer under an alter ego concept.' ' In Faragher, the Court did
not address this provision. In neither Ellerth nor Faragher did the Court dwell on
section 219(2)(b) ("the master was negligent or reckless"), because this narrower
basis of liability is accepted uncontroversially (and is the only basis of employer
liability for coworker harassment). °0
Section 219(2)(c) provides for employer liability for employee conduct outside
the scope of employment when "the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of duty
of the master."'0 3 Section 219(2)(c) of the Restatement recognizes that, in some
instances, the law imposes automatic liability on employers for harms caused by their
agents, irrespective of employer fault, by stating that employers have a nondelegable
duty to protect certain persons from certain harms." Usually, the nondelegable duty
rule reflects a notion that a special relationship between the employer and the victim
requires strict liability for harms the employer's agents may cause.' Some
01 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267.
102 See id.; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2278.
103 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(c).
1o4 See id. Section 214 of the Restatement defines the nondelegable duty as:
[a] master or other principal who is under a duty to provide protection for or to
have care used to protect others or their property and who confides the
performance of such duty to a servant or other person is subject to liability to
such others for harm caused to them by the failure of such agent to perform the
duty.
Id. § 214.
'o1 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267. The special relationship includes, in some jurisdictions,
the common carrier-passenger relationship, see, e.g., Gilstrap v. Amtrak, 998 F.2d 559, 561-
62 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Washington law to find a railroad vicariously liable for the
sexual assault of a passenger by an employee of the railroad); Nazareth v. Hemdon
Ambulance Serv., Inc., 467 So. 2d 1076, 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (finding an
ambulance service vicariously liable for the sexual assault of a patient by an ambulance
attendant); St. Michelle v. Catania, 250 A.2d 874, 878 (Md. 1969) (finding a taxicab
company vicariously liable for the sexual assault and robbery of a passenger by a cab driver
employed by the company), the relationship of a long-term health care facilities to their
minor patients, see, e.g., Stropes v. Heritage House Children's Ctr. of Shelbyville, Inc., 547
N.E.2d 244, 253-54 (Ind. 1989) (determining that a long-term care facility was vicariously
liable for the sexual assault of a minor patient/resident by a nurse's aide); cf California Ass'n
of Health Facilities v. Department of Health Servs., 940 P.2d 323, 332, 335 (Cal. 1997)
(interpreting a statute regarding the licensing of long-term care facilities), the relationship of
schools to students, see, e.g., Eversole v. Wasson, 398 N.E.2d 1246, 1247-48 (II!. App. Ct.
1980) (finding a school vicariously liable for an assault by a teacher of a student that resulted
from a personal and nonschool-related dispute); Carabba v. Anacortes Sch. Dist. No. 103,
435 P.2d 936, 948 (Wash. 1968) (determining that a school was vicariously liable for injuries
caused due to the negligence of a referee during a school-sponsored wrestling match), and
even the relationship of a county jail to its inmates needing medical attention, see, e.g.,
Robinson v. Washington County, 529 A.2d 1357, 1361-62 (Me. 1987) (holding that ajail
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commentators have argued that Title VII imposes such a duty to provide a workplace
free from harassment, but courts have declined, without much analysis, to read Title
VII as providing for such automatic liability for harassment. 0 6 In Ellerth, Justice
Kennedy rejected out of hand the notion that the employer has a nondelegable duty
to provide a workplace free of harassment and, thus, should be liable under section
219(2)(c).' '
The agency principle that Ellerth and Faragher deemed most relevant in
assessing vicarious liability for supervisory sexual harassment is stated in section
219(2)(d): the employer is liable when the tortfeasor "was aided in accomplishing the
tort by the existence of the agency relation."' ' Recognizing that the "agency
relation" aids most employee wrongdoers in the sense that it produces "[p]roximity
and regular contact,"'" the Court in Ellerth concluded that the agency relation aids
supervisors in harassing subordinates when they threaten or inflict adverse
employment action, but doubted that the agency relation aids threats of adverse action
that are never carried out."0 The Court's explanation for this is opaque:
On the one hand, a supervisor's power and authority invests his or her
harassing conduct with a particular threatening character, and in this
sense, a supervisor always is aided by the agency relation.... On the
other hand, there are acts of harassment a supervisor might commit which
may be vicariously liable for an injury to a pretrial detainee caused by the denial of necessary
medical care).
Occasionally the nondelegable duty is assumed by contract, as in contracts of bailment,
see, e.g., Joseph v. Mutual Garage Co., Inc., 270 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954)
(finding a garage liable for damages to a car driven by a garage employee outside the scope
of his employment), insurance contracts, see, e.g., Walter v. Simmons, 818 P.2d 214, 223
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) holding that an insurer's duty of good faith nondelegable and,
therefore, the insurer is vicariously liable for the intentional torts of a nonemployee insurance
adjuster), and other contracts for the provision of services,see, e.g., Lou-Con, Inc. v. Gulf
Bldg. Servs., Inc., 287 So. 2d 192, 201 (La. Ct. App. 1973) (finding a janitorial services firm
liable for arson committed outside the scope of employment by one of its janitors).
Other jurisdictions, however, decline to recognize nondelegable duties and, thus, reject
vicarious liability in these sorts of cases for torts committed outside the scope of
employment. See infra note 269.
106 See Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 94-97; Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual
Harassment Liability Under Agency Principles: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REV. 122, 1252-55 (1991); Justin S. Weddle, Note, Title VII
Sexual Harassment: Recognizing an Employer's Non-Delegable Duty to Prevent a Hostile
Workplace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 724, 742-48 (1995).
'07 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2267 ("There is no contention.., that a nondelegable duty
is involved.").
l0 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d).
109 Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2268.
"o See id. at 2269.
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might be the same acts a co-employee would commit, and there may be
some circumstances where the supervisor's status makes little
difference."'
In the statement above, the Court incorrectly assumed that the agency relation never
aids coworker harassment. Rather thanjustifiy this assumption in terms of the policy
or precedent in civil rights or tort cases, the Court simply said that it "is a developing
feature of agency law," and then abruptly abandoned it as d guiding principle." 2
In the rest of its analysis in Ellerth, the Court failed to explain why supervisors
are not aided by the agency relation in accomplishing harassment that involves only
unfulfilled threats of retaliation, or no explicit threats at all. Instead, the Court simply
quoted language from Meritor"'3 that "'Congress' decision to define "employer" to
include any "agent" of an employer... surely evinces an intent to place some limits
on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to be held
responsible,"' and then observed that Congress has not amended Title VII to overrule
Meritor."4 The Court identified Title VII policies that encourage employers to
develop antiharassment policies, favor conciliation rather than litigation and purport
to draw from them a new rule creating presumptive employer liability." '5 Such
liability would be subject to the affirmative defense that the employer had a
reasonable harassment policy and the victim unreasonably failed to use it." 6 The
Court never explained how this rule flows from the "aided in the agency relation"
rule. Thus, the Court created out of whole cloth a more restrictive vicarious liability
rule than tort law uses while purporting to draw the rule from the Restatement.
In Faragher, as in Ellerth, the Court recognized that the "aided in the agency
relation" standard would point to employer liability for all supervisory harassment." 7
"The agency relationship affords contact with an employee subjected to a
supervisor's sexual harassment, and the victim may well be reluctant to accept the
risks of blowing the whistle on a superior." '' " Employer liability for supervisory
harassment makes sense because the employer has "opportunity and incentive to
screen them, train them, and monitor their performance."' "9 The only reason given
in Faragher for limiting employer liability is Title VII's suppdsed "primary
objective," which "is not to provide redress but to avoid harm."' 20 Citing EEOC
. Id. (citation omitted).
112 Id.
"' 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
114 Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72).
"' See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
116 See id.
" Id. at 2268; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2290 (1998).
118 Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2291.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 2292.
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regulations "advising employers to 'take all steps necessary to prevent sexual
harassment from occurring,""2' the Court concluded Title VII policy would be served
best by "giv[ing] credit here to employers who make reasonable efforts to discharge
their duty."' The Court also justified the employer's affirmative defense by relying
on a "policy imported from the general theory of damages" that required the plaintiff
to make reasonable efforts to avoid or to mitigate the harm.'23
The Faragher and Ellerth majority opinions were creative in their method of
statutory interpretation, but unsatisfying in their reasoning. Both did a better job of
laying out the reasons, drawn both from torts and from Title VII, that would support
broad vicarious liability than they did of refuting these reasons. The decisions place
significant reliance on the stare decisis of Meritor, a case that disclaimed any intent
to interpret definitively the statute and, thus, was almost devoid of analysis. In both
cases, the Court. looked. to the general policies of Title VII to design an employer
liability rule." The Court may be faulted for picking a rule that invokes some Title
VII policies while ignoring others and honors the wrong ones at the expense of the
right ones. The method of statutory interpretation, however, acknowledges the
indeterminacy of the statute and the responsibility of the judiciary for designing a
rule.
C. Section 1983
The Court took a very different approach to the issue of vicarious liability under
Section 1983, rejecting respondeat superior liability entirely. Under Section 1983,
the only possible entity defendants are municipalities. Section 1983 applies only to
actions under "color of law" which means that there must be state action; private
entities generally cannot be sued for violation of this law.'25, For example, in Lugar
v. Edmondson Oil Co.," 6 the Supreme Court explained: "it is clear that in a § 1983
action brought against a state official, the statutory requirement of action 'under color
of state law' and the 'state action' requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment are
identical."'27 Nor can state governments be sued for violating Section 1983. In Will
I21 d. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(f) (1997)).
122 Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292.
23 Id (citing Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219,231 n.15 (1982)).
124 See Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2290-91; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct.
1257, 2268-70 (1998).
2' See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
126 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
127 Id. at 929. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) ("[lf a defendant's conduct
satisfies the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, 'that conduct [is] also
action under color of state law and will support a suit under § 1983."' (quoting Lugar, 457
U.S. at 935)).
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v. Michigan Department of State Police,'28 the Court held that state governments are
not persons under Section 1983 and, thus, may not be sued even in state court under
this statute.'29 The Court said that it "cannot conclude that § 1983 was intended to
disregard the well-established immunity of a State from being sued without its
consent."'
130
Therefore, the issue of vicarious liability is narrower under Section 1983 than
under other civil rights statutes because the question is solely when, if at all,
municipalities can be found liable on a respondeat superior basis. The Court's
answer has been to reject respondeat superior liability in Section 1983 claims,
holding that municipalities are liable only for violations resulting from their own
policies.
31
The Court based this conclusion on its reading of the unusual history of Section
1983. The Court initially read this history to reject any municipal liability under
Section 1983. In 1961, in Monroe v. Pape,'32 the Supreme Court held that municipal
governments may not be sued under Section 1983.' In Monroe, the plaintiffs
sought damages both from individual officers and from their employer, the city of
Chicago, for allegedly unconstitutional police conduct. Although the Court upheld
the potential liability of the officers, it concluded that "Congress did not undertake
to bring municipal corporations within the ambit of [Section 1983]."'
The Court in Monroe based this conclusion on its reading of the legislative
history of Section 1983. 3 When the statute that contained Section 1983 was debated
before the Senate, Senator Sherman of Ohio proposed an amendment that would have
created municipal liability for certain acts of violence, even though the city and its
officials did not participate and were not responsible directly. 3 6 The apparent
objective of the Sherman Amendment was to overcome municipal inaction in the
face of widespread Klan activities by giving cities a powerful monetary incentive to
128 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
129 See Will, 491 U.S. at 65-66. The Eleventh Amendment bars states from being sued in
federal court. In Quern v. Jordan, the Court ruled that Section 1983 does not override a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979).
130 Will, 491 U.S. at 67.
' Section 1983 is the exclusive remedy for violations of the rights guaranteed under
Section 1981 and, thus, the official policy rule applies to Section 1981 claims too. See Jett
v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735-36 (1989).
32 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
133 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
134 id.
"' See id. at 188, 191.
136 See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871).
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prevent violence. Although the Senate approved the Sherman Amendment, the
House rejected it; and a Conference Committee deleted it.'
Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Monroe, concluded that the rejection
of the Sherman Amendment reflected a desire to immunize cities from liability. 38
Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that the Dictionary Act,' 39 which
defined "person" to include "bodies politic and corporate," was a basis for holding
cities liable. 40 Justice Douglas concluded that the definition in the Dictionary Act
was "merely an allowable, not a mandatory, one."'' Thus, in Monroe the Court
precluded all municipal liability under Section 1983, whether for damages or
equitable relief' 42
Monroe's review of Section 1983's legislative history has been sharply
criticized.'43 In 1978, in the landmark decision of Monell v. Department of Social
Services, the Supreme Court expressly overruled Monroe's limitation on municipal
liability.'" Monell involved a suit against the city of New York challenging a policy
requiring pregnant teachers to take unpaid leaves of absences.'45 The Supreme Court
again reviewed the legislative history of Section 1983 and concluded that the Monroe
Court had erred in preventing municipal liability."4 Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, stated that the rejection of the Sherman Amendment was meant to prevent
municipal liability for the wrongful acts of others; it was not intended to preclude
municipalities from being held liable for their own violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 47 The Sherman Amendment would have created an affirmative duty
for cities to stop violence within their borders; its defeat was meant to prevent new
131 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188; Robert J. Kaczorowski, Reflections on the Legislative
History of Monell v. Department of Social Services, 31 URB. LAW. (forthcoming Spring
1999).
138 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191.
"' Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 (1871). The Dictionary Act was enacted
a few months before the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which contained Section 1983.
40 See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190-9 1.
..' Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191.
142 See id; see also City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973) (citing Monroe
which held that equitable relief and damages are not allowed against municipalities under
Section 1983); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 701-03 (1973) (stating that
monetary relief is not allowed against municipalities); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 16-
17 (1976) (finding that pendent party jurisdiction could not be the basis for Section 1983
suits in federal court against municipalities).
'43 See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr. & J. Anthony Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131, 134-36 (1972); Ronald M.
Levin, The Section 1983 Municipal Immunity Doctrine, 65 GEO. L.J. 1483, 1519-31 (1977).
144 See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978).
141 See id. at 661.
146 See id at 683.
147 See id
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liability from being created for private acts, not to totally immunize cities.
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the Dictionary Act of 1871, enacted only
months before the Civil Rights Act containing Section 1983, defined "persons" to
include "bodies politic and corporate. '1 s
Thus, the Court in Monell declared that "Congress did intend municipalities and
other local government units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983
applies."'49 However, the Court imposed a substantial limitation on this liability:
Municipal governments may be sued only for their own unconstitutional or illegal
policies but not for the acts of their employees. The Court stated:
[T]he language of § 1983, read against the background of the same
.legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend
municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official
municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort. In particular,
we conclude that a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it
employs a tortfeasor--or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held
liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.'
In limiting municipal liability to instances of official policy or custom, the Court
focused on the language of Section 1983, which imposes liability on "[e]very person
who.., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen.., to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities."'5 ' The Court in Monell concluded that this
language meant that cities could be held responsible only for the actions their policies
caused.' Additionally, the Court said that although respondeat superior liability
might deter wrongdoing or spread costs among the larger community, the rejection
of the Sherman Amendment was a repudiation of deterrence and risk spreading as the
goals for Section 1983.' Thus, the Court's holding in Monell was clear:
a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted
solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by
those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,
inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under §
1983.
141 Id at 688 (citing Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 18 F. Cas. 393, 394
(C.C.N.D. I11. 1873) (No. 10,336)).
141 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
1so Id at 691.
'5' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
152 See Monel!, 436 U.S. at 694.
113 See id at 693-94.
i4 Id. at 694.
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In the years since Monell, courts have developed an elaborate and complicated
body of doctrine limiting local government liability under Section 1983.'
Increasingly, some of the Justices are indicating dissatisfaction with this approach.
It now appears that fourjustices-Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer-are ready
to overrule Monell and to allow respondeat superior liability for municipalities under
Section 1983. In Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma
v. Brown,156 Justice Breyer, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, sharply criticized Monell and declared-that "the case for reexamination is
a strong one."'57 Justice Breyer argued that neither the language of Section 1983 nor
its legislative history supports Moneil's preclusion ofvicarious liability.'58 Moreover,
Justice Breyer stated that "Monell's basic effort to distinguish between vicarious
liability and liability derived from 'policy or custom' has produced a body of law that
is neither readily understandable nor easy to apply.'" Justice Breyer also argued
that "relevant legal and factual circumstances may have changed in a way that affects
likely reliance upon Monell's liability limitation. The legal complexity.., makes it
difficult for municipalities to predict just when they will be held liable based upon
'policy or custom." '' l For now, however, the law remains that respondeat superior
liability cannot be imposed on local governments under Section 1983.
D. Title IX
The Court has taken yet a third approach to the vicarious liability problem in
Title IX cases. In doing so, the Court adopted the most restrictive vicarious liability
rule of the three. In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, the Court
held that school districts are vicariously liable for harassment by employee teachers
only if the school district has actual notice of the harassment and is deliberately
indifferent to the conduct.' 6' Presumably, the same actual notice plus deliberate
indifference standard will apply to racial harassment cases under Title VI, as the
Supreme Court noted in Gebser that Title IX "was modeled after Title VI" and that
the two statutes are "parallel," with Title IX covering gender discrimination and Title
VI covering race discrimination in federally funded education programs.'
62
Additionally, the Court relied on Guardians Association v. Civil Service
'5s See I MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 428-40 (2d
ed. 1991).
156 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
157 Id. at 437 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
'" See id. at 430-33 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
'9 Id. at 433 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 436 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
161 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (1998).
162 Id. at 1997.
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Commission,6 3 a Title VI case holding that relief in cases alleging unintentional
discrimination should be prospective only,"u to support the conclusion that school
district liability requires district officials to have actual knowledge of an employee's
discriminatory conduct. 61
Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in any education program receiving federal
funds.6 The Court found a private right of action for Title IX violations in Cannon
v. University of Chicago, 16 and held, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools,16 that victims of discrimination prohibited by Title IX may recover
monetary damages. 69 In Franklin, the Court held that school districts are liable
under Title IX for damages for teacher harassment of students. 7" In finding sexual
harassment of students actionable under Title IX, the Court in Franklin relied on and
quoted Meritor:
Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Public Schools
the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and "when a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that
supervisor "discriminate[s]" on the basis of sex."... We believe the same
rule should apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a
student. 171
Relying on Franklin's analogy between Title VII and Title IX, the plaintiff and
the United States, as amicus curiae, argued in Gebser for school district liability
based on the aided-by-the-agency-relation standard.7 7 The Court, however, declined
to hold the district liable in every case where the teacher's authority facilitates the
harassment. 173
The Court began its defense of a more limited liability rule by distinguishing the
language of Title IX from that of Title VII. Title VII, the Court pointed out, defines
an employer to include agents of the employer, whereas "Title IX contains no
163 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
64 See id. at 598.
165 See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1998 (citing Guardians, 463 U.S. at 598).
166 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994) ("No person in the United States shall ... be subjected to
discrimination under any education program .. ; receiving Federal financial assistance.").
167, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979).
168 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
169 See id at 76.
7o See id at 75.
17' Id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (citation
omitted)).
172 See Brief for Petitioner, 1998 WL 19745, at *36, Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998) (No. 96-1866); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, 1998
WL 24199, at * 12, Gebser (No. 96-1866).
"' See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999; id. at 2003-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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comparable reference to an educational institution's 'agents,' and so does not
expressly call for application of agency principles."'74 Of course it does not; Title IX,
as written, provides for no liability whatsoever. Because the statute as written
provides only for administrative actions against school districts, Congress did not
need to consider the circumstances when schools would be liable for the acts of their
employees. The Court suggested that because Title IX does not, unlike Title VII,
provide explicitly for a private right of action for monetary damages, Title VII cannot
be analogized to Title IX." The Court's analysis, however, does precisely that.
In Gebser, the Court identified two main reasons for limiting employer liability
under Title IX to employer fault. First, vicarious liability under Title IX would
provide a greater damages recovery than is available under Title VII, because Title
VII contains damages caps (imposed by the Civil Rights Act of 1991) and Title IX
does not (because the right of action is implied). 6 The Court thought it odd to allow
unlimited recovery under the implied right of action when Congress limited the
amount of recovery under the express right of action. 7
The Court found a second reason for rejecting any form of vicarious liability in
Title IX's "contractual framework."'7 Title IX, as written by Congress, conditions
receipt of federal funds upon a promise not to discriminate. ' The "central concern"
of such a contractual framework is "ensuring 'that the receiving entity of federal
funds [has] notice that it will be liable for a monetary award."" 8 In support of the
notion that notice to the employer is crucial, the Court observed that the express form
of implementation of Title IX-agency enforcement-requires the agency to give
notice to the funds recipient before cutting off federal funds.'8 '
It would be unsound, we think, for a statute's express system of
enforcement to require notice to the recipient and an opportunity to come
into voluntary compliance while a judicially implied system of
enforcement permits substantial liability without regard to the recipient's
knowledge or its corrective actions upon receiving notice.'
174 Id. at 1996.
171 See id
176 See id. at 1997.
171 See id
78 See id.
1 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
10 Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1998 (quoting Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S.
60, 74 (1992) (alteration in original)).
18' See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1998.
182 Id. at 1999.
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Having made notice of the crucial issue, the Court easily rejected employer liability
in the absence of actual notice.'83
The Court in Gebser also drew from the agency enforcement provisions of Title
IX the requirement that plaintiffs suing on the implied right of action prove not only
actual notice but also deliberate indifference. 84 The Court analogized this to the
standard when the agency enforces Title IX in which the recipient must be given an
opportunity to come into compliance before funding is terminated. 5
As Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion, which three justices joined, pointed out
in Gebser, the Court's drastic limit on liability represented a very sharp restriction on
the cause of action implied in Cannon for which the Court unanimously had
concluded in Franklin that damages are an available remedy. 6 Once the Court
decided, in Franklin and Cannon, that individual victims of sex discrimination could
sue schools for damages under Title IX, 87 the limits relevant to agency enforcement
of the statute no longer were limits on the relief available to private plaintiffs. The
Court's notion in Gebser that the administrative enforcement scheme operates as a
limit on the remedies available in a private right of action is inconsistent with
Franklin. It also is inconsistent with Congress' intent, which implicitly approved
a damages remedy when, after Franklin, it amended Title IX to abrogate the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Congress' abrogation of the immunity was
necessary to allow a damages recovery in Title IX cases because the defendant public
school districts are state government instrumentalities. Congress approved the
private right of action for damages when it amended the statute.
The very purpose of a private right of action for damages is to allow a remedy in
circumstances when the express statutory enforcement scheme would not. Indeed,
in allowing such a remedy in Franklin, the Court noted that the agency had declined
to cut funding in that case.'88 What the agency required of the school district simply
was considered irrelevant in Franklin to the questions whether the plaintiff should
be corfpensated for the harm she suffered and whether, by awarding damages, the
implied right of action would provide an additional and alternative financial incentive
for schools to ensure that students suffer no discrimination. By the Court's decision
in Franklin which found that there is a private right of action for damages under Title
IX, it rejected the position that damages liability for discriminatory actions is
inconsistent with Title IX's purpose or policy. The resulting question then should
183 See id. at 2000.
184 See id. at 1999.
185 See id.
86 See id at 2005 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch.,
503 U.S. 60, 71 (1992)).
187 See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75; Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-98
(1979).
18' See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 64 n.3.
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be: When does vicarious liability advance the Title IX purpose of eliminating sex
discrimination in schools?
II. WHY VICARIOUS LIABILITY SHOULD EXIST IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
A. The Statutory Interpretation Problem
Neither Title VII, Title IX, nor Section 1983 contains language that dictates
unambiguously the scope of employer liability for civil rights violations committed
by employees. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court's approach to the statutory
lacunae reflect the changing fashions in methods of statutory interpretation and the
changing composition of the Supreme Court. The language of Title VII sheds little
light on the vicarious liability issue. That statute makes it unlawful for an
"employer" to discriminate in the terms or conditions of employment" 9 and defines
"employer" to include "agents."'" Although the Supreme Court stated in Ellerth that
by including the term "agent" in the statutory definition of employer, "[i]n express
terms, Congress has directed federal courts to interpret Title VII based on agency
principles,"'' one might be forgiven for thinking that this was something less than
an express, unambiguous direction to use "traditional agency principles" to discern
the proper scope of employer liability.'92
Indeed, it is possible to read the language of Title VII as providing for employer
liability for unfair practices by "any person" not just employers' "agents."
Throughout the statute, Title VII states that a charge or a suit may be filed against an
"employer" or "respondent." Sections 703 and 704 make it an unlawful employment
practice for "an employer" to discriminate.'93 Section 706(b) provides that
"[w]henever a charge is filed ... alleging that an employer ... has engaged in an
unlawful employment practice, the Commission" must notify "such employer."'
9 4
189 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (1994). Section 703(a) of Title VII provides, in pertinent
part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer--(l) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's... sex." Id Other subsections of sections 703 and 704, the sections of Title VII
that prohibit specified discriminatory practices, are written in similar terms.
"' Section 701(b) of Title VII provides, in pertinent part: "The term 'employer' means
a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce .... and any agent of such a
person.. . ." Id. § 2000e(b).
', Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2265 (1998).
'92 In Meritor, the Court assumed that the use of the term "agent" "surely evinces an intent
to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title VII are to'be
held responsible." Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
"' See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), e-3(a).
'9' Id. §2000e-5(b).
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Section 706(f) authorizes the Commission or the person filing a charge to bring an
action against a "respondent,"' 95 and "respondent" is defined in section 701 to mean
"an employer.' 19 6 Furthermore, section 706(g)(1) states that back pay is "payable by
the employer ... responsible for the unlawful employment practice. '
The few instances in which Title VII refers to "person" instead of employer,
however, suggest a more expansive rule of employer liability. For instance, section
706(a), which gives the Commission its enforcement authority, states: "The
Commission is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from
engaging in any unlawful employment practice as set forth in section [703] or [704]
of this title."'98 "Person" is defined in section 701 to include "one or more
individuals."' 99
Because Congress carefully distinguished between "persons" and "employers"
in the definition section200 and stated clearly in section 706(g)(1) that back pay is
payable by "the employer," one can conclude that Congress, when using the broader
term "person" in section 706(a), meant to suggest that the enforcement actions
against "employers" or "respondents" authorized under the rest of section 706 are
intended to prevent "individuals" from committing unfair employment practices. In
short, while it is true that employers are defined in the definition section (section 701)
to include "agents," '' the enforcement section (section 706) states that enforcement
activities are to stop any "person" (not just "agents") from discriminating.2 2 Thus,
even if only "employers" can be sued and are liable for back pay under Title VII (or
damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1991203), the very first section of the
enforcement provision makes clear that enforcement against employers is intended
to stop "any individual" from discriminating. This theory means that the statute
makes employers liable for discrimination by any person, not just by "agents."
See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
'96 See id. § 2000e(n).
117 Id. § 2000e-5(g)(l).
'98 Id. § 2000e-5(a).
'99 Id. § 2000e(a). Additionally, section 706(e)(1) provides that a charge "shall be served
upon the person against whom such charge is made." Id § 2000e-5(e)(1). This requirement
is a bit harder to square with the rest of section 706, because section 706(b) states that when
"a charge is filed ... alleging that an employer.., has engaged in an unfair employment
practice, the Commission shall serve a notice of the charge.., on such employer." Id. §
2000e-5(b). Apparently, the Commission is supposed to notify the "employer" of the charge,
but the charging party is supposed to serve the charge on a "person."
200 See id. §§ 2000e(a)-(b).
201 See id. § 2000e(b).
202 See id. § 2000e-5(a).
203 See id § 1981a(a)(1) ("In an action... under section 706 ... of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964... against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination... the
complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages."); id § 1981 a(b)(1) ("A
complaining party may recover punitive damages under this section against a respondent.").
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When the Court essayed to develop employer liability rules in Ellerth and
Faragher, it overlooked the enforcement section of Title VII, focusing instead on just
a part of the definition. Perhaps it did so because it believed it was constrained in its
statutory interpretation by the stare decisis effect of Meritor. Ironically, Meritor
disclaimed any intent to declare a definitive rule, except that "courts ... [should]
look to agency principles for guidance in this area" and that "the Court of Appeals
erred in concluding that employers are always automatically liable for sexual
harassment by their supervisors."" Justice Rehnquist provided no justification for
his conclusion that the statutory definition of "employer" as including "agent"
reflects "an intent to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers
under Title VII are to be held responsible.""2 5 For the reasons just given, other
statutory language supports a broader liability rule. But even if one relies only on the
language quoted by Justice Rehnquist, it does not follow necessarily that employers
are not strictly liable for supervisory harassment, as opposed to harassment by
coworkers or customers.
Congress' intent in enacting Title VII and its various amendments also leaves
much to the imagination. At the time it was enacted in 1964, no doubt sexual
harassment was not on the minds of many, if any, of the legislators who voted for it.
They probably wanted to eliminate all forms of discriminatory working
conditions-not just hiring and firing, but also "quality of life" conditions like de
facto and dejure job segregation and, indeed, a whole culture of racial insults and
subordination. They obviously knew that such things were accomplished notjust by
formal policies dictated by the corporate headquarters. If pressed, they might have
recognized that a workplace culture of racial inequality is perpetuated not only by the
formal decisions of managers and supervisors, but also by the conduct of coworkers.
But that reality says little about what sort of employer liability rules they would have
deemed necessary to eradicate pervasive inequality. By the time the most recent
amendments to Title VII were adopted in 1991, Congress obviously was more
sophisticated about sexual harassment than when Title VII was adopted originally.
But courts imposed most of the limits on vicarious and individual liability after 1991.
Thus, one honestly cannot infer much from Congress' failure to address vicarious
liability.
Section 1983 is no more clear on vicarious liability than Title VII. The statute,
as noted above, speaks in terms of "any person."206 The rejection of the Sherman
Amendment leads to the conclusion that municipalities were not to be held liable for
violence by private citizens. It leaves open, however, the possibility that Congress
intended municipal liability under Section 1983 to be vicarious for their employees'
actions, as vicarious liability was the norm in other areas of municipal law at that
204 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
205 Id.
206 See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
1999]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
time.2°7 Leaving open the possibility, of course, is a far cry from compelling the
conclusion. Thus, nothing in the language, legislative history, or any other evidence
of congressional intent provides clear direction on the scope of employer liability
under Section 1983. Congress neither provided for nor precluded vicarious liability
for the harms caused by their employees,
Although Title IX's language may be the least helpful of all on the question of
vicarious school damages liability for teacher harassment of students, Congress'
intent that school districts be liable for damages for sex discrimination by teachers
and other school employees is luminously clear from the Title IX amendments which
followed Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools."' When Congress abrogated
the Eleventh Amendment immunity for Title IX actions, it must have intended school
districts to pay damages for the discriminatory acts of their employees. What other
reason would there be to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity? After all,
schools are not people and they only act through their employees. More specifically,
Congress probably thought it was clearing the way for school districts to pay damages
in cases like Franklin, in which the school district officials knew about the
harassment and did nothing about it.
The problem is that Congress did not state, and probably did not consider, what
other kinds of sex discrimination, by which employees, would form the basis of
damages liability, or whether it was essential that the school district know about it or
be somehow at fault in failing to prevent or remedy it, As Justice Stevens pointed out
in dissent in Gebser, there is no reason to believe that Congress intended to allow
vicarious liability only on facts like those in Franklin.°9 Thus, for Title IX, as for
Section 1983 and Title VII, one must go beyond the language and legislative history
to analyze the proper scope of employer liability. Statutory purpose is the other
source of guidance help. We turn to that below.
Before examining legislative purpose, however, it is worth remarking on the
significant differences in reasoning that the Court used to develop its disparate rules
under Section 1983, Title VII, and Title IX. Whereas in Monell the Court depended
heavily on the legislative history of Section 1983,2"' the Court paid no attention to the
legislative history of Title VII in Faragher and Ellerth and only slight attention to the
legislative history of Title IX in Gebser. The obvious explanation for the different
methods of reasoning is that, since Monell, the Court has become noticeably less
likely to rely on legislative history as its principal justification in a decision on a
question of statutory interpretation."' Of course, the changing fashion in the
207 See Kaczorowski, supra note 137.
208 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
209 See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 2003 n.6 (1998) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
20 See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 665-90 (1978).
2' See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme
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methods of statutory interpretation does not necessarily account for the different
results. Brennan's opinion for the Court in Monell cannot be interpreted to mean that
cities would not be vicariously liable simply because of the legislative history. One
may surmise that there simply were not five votes for full municipal vicarious
liability no matter what the legislative history might have been thought to show.
Indeed, after completely rejecting municipal liability in Monroe, allowing it, but
without vicarious liability, was seen as a major victory for civil rights plaintiffs. And,
for the reasons suggested above, the Court likely would not have reached a different
outcome in Gebser if it had studied the legislative history of Title IX.
B. Purposes Served by Vicarious Liability
Vicarious liability for tortious conduct of employees serves three purposes. First,
it reduces the incidence of tortious conduct by providing a financial incentive for
employers to prevent it by exercising care in hiring and disciplining employees and
supervisors.212 Second, it assures adequate compensation for victims harmed by
harassment who often have no reasonable possibility of collecting from an alleged
harasser who is judgment-proof."3 Third, for the unavoidable harms, vicarious
liability spreads the risk to the shareholders, if the cost of tort claims reduces profits,
or to all employees, if the cost of tort claims results in lower wages,214 and/or to
consumers, if the costs are reflected in higher prices for the employer's goods or
211services. 2
The arguments for respondeat superior liability are as forceful in civil rights
cases as they are in ordinary tort cases. The civil rights law, no less than tort law,
regards adequate compensation to victims and deterrence of violations as preeminent
goals.
Court, 30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 275, 277 (1998); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of
the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 356 (1994); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The
Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the
Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 754-62 (1995).
212 See HARPER ET AL., supra note 39, § 26.5, at 21; KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, at 501.
Some economic analyses of vicarious liability have questioned whether such liability
efficiently serves these purposes in all cases. See Sykes, supra note 12, at 565-70.
Nevertheless, Sykes concludes that vicarious liability does efficiently serve the functions of
deterrence and compensation efficiently under some circumstances. See id. at 569-70.
213 See Sykes, supra note 12, at 567-70 (discussing circumstances in which vicarious or
personal liability rules may create incentives for employers and judgment-proof employees
to engage in hazardous conduct).
214 See HARPER ET AL., supra note 39, § 26.5, at 22.
215 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, at 500-01; Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 90, 92.
For a discussion of the policies served by vicarious liability in sexual harassment cases, see
id. at 90-94; Verkerke, supra note 12, at 286-316.
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1. Vicarious Liability Serves the Purposes of Title VII
The purposes of Title VII are compensation and deterrence.2t6 Vicarious liability
is not only consistent with those statutory purposes, it is necessary to achieve them.
Without vicarious liability, many victims of discrimination would have no cause of
action at all (because the majority of courts reject individual liability),217 and
employers would have little incentive to vigorously prevent discriminatory actions
by low-level supervisors and employees.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that compensation for persons injured
by unlawful discrimination is appropriate even when the employer acted in good
faith.218 In rejecting a rule that would limit the availability of back pay when the
employer acted in good faith, the Court said that to deny recovery
would read the "make whole" purpose right out of Title VII, for a
worker's injury is no less real simply because his employer did not inflict
it in "bad faith." Title VII is not concerned with the employer's "good
intent or absence of discriminatory intent" for "Congress directed the
thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply
the motivation. 219
But in Ellerth and Faragher, the Court thought that limits on vicarious liability
served statutory purposes.22° Thus, the question arises whether vicarious liability or
the Court's affirmative defense scheme better serves Title VII's purposes.
If statutory language, structure, or history often is frustratingly indeterminate on
questions of interpretation, resort to statutory purposes often is little more
216 See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228 (1982) ("The 'primary objective' of
Title VII is to bring employment discrimination to an end."); id. at 230 ("Title VIi's
secondary, fallback purpose is to compensate the victims for their injuries. To this end,
section 706(g) aims "'to make the victims of unlawful discrimination whole"' by restoring
them, "'so far as possible.., to a position where they would have been were it not for the
unlawful discrimination .... (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421
(1975) (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. S7168 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1972) (statement of Sen.
Williams)))); Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 417 ("[T]he primary objective [of Title VII] was a
prophylactic one."); id at 418 ("it is also the purpose of Title VII to make persons whole for
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination."); Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1071 ("The Congress finds
that-(1) additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and
intentional discrimination in the workplace.").
217 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
218 See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 422.
Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
220 See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998); Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2291 n.4 (1998).
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constraining on judicial discretion. Most statutes can be said to have a range of
purposes, and the outcome on particular issues can depend on which of the several
statutory purposes the court chooses to pursue. Vicarious liability for sexual
harassment under Title VII is a perfect example of this problem. In limiting vicarious
employer liability for supervisory harassment unaccompanied by adverse job
decisions, the Court in Ellerth and Faragher asserted that it was promoting the
purposes of Title VIi.22L ' In particular, the Court said that when employer liability
depends on whether the employer has a sex harassment policy and complaint
procedure, the employer has an incentive to create such policies and employees have
incentives to use them.222 This result, the Court claimed, "would effect Congress'
intention to promote conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII ... context and
the EEOC's policy of encouraging the development of grievance procedures. 223
Barring vicarious liability when the employee fails to use a complaint procedure,
the Court thought, "could encourage employees to report harassing conduct before
it becomes severe or pervasive," which "would also serve Title VII's deterrent
purpose."224 Thus, the way to serve the purposes of Title VII was to limit liability.25
There are three principal problems with the Court's analysis of Title VII
purposes. First, it ignores the compensatory purpose of Title VII. Some victims of
egregious sexual, racial, or religious harassment will have no remedy. At least since
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, compensation of injured employees has been a core
purpose of Title VII.226 Some law and economics literature supports the propositions
that employees will not be compensated in the form of higher wages for the risk of
harm from sexual harassment and that employer liability is necessary to compensate
those victims. 22
7
A second problem with the Court's reasoning about statutory purposes is its
reliance on shaping incentives for employees. The average sexual harassment victim
probably is not going to read Ellerth and Faragher, so she will never know that, if
she wants to file a lawsuit later, she had better register a complaint with her employer
first. By the time she consults a lawyer, she probably no longer will be working for
the employer, and it will be too late.
221 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292.
222 See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292.
223 Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270 (citations omitted).
224 Id.
225 See id.
226 One of the crucial provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 made compensatory and
punitive damages available in Title VII suits. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(l), (b) (1994). In
so amending Title VII, Congress made findings that additional remedies were necessary to
deter harassment and intentional discrimination and, thus, stated the purpose of the statute
was to provide "additional remedies" for them. Civil Rights Act of 199 1, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, § 2(1), Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1071.
227 See Sykes, supra note 12, at 605-08.
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The third flaw is the Court's approach to the question of shaping incentives for
employers. The employer liability scheme that best shapes incentives to prevent
intentional harm long has been the subject of hot debate among scholars.228 To the
extent that harassment is preventable through better hiring, supervision, or training,
employer liability creates incentives to expend resources in those tasks. If no
vicarious liability for harassment unaccompanied by adverse job action exists,
employers have no incentive to eliminate the harassment. An employer only needs
to maintain and to publicize a policy against sexual harassment and a complaint
procedure, to take action on the complaints it receives and to try to prevent
supervisors from discriminating in hiring and firing. Beyond that, Title VII, as
construed by the Court in Ellerth and Faragher, gives the employer no incentive to
find out for itself which supervisors are harassers. As long as the supervisor
separates harassment from its job decisions that have economic repercussions, the
employer need not worry. Nor is the employer encouraged to make it easy for
employees to file complaints (as long as it is not so difficult to complain that a jury
might conclude that the employer's policy was unreasonable or that a plaintiff was
reasonable in failing to make a complaint).
But what about employer liability for harassment that it could not prevent? It
seems probable that some supervisors and other employees will harass workers no
matter what the employer does to prevent it (at least until the employer fires them).
As to this category of "unavoidable" harassment, the only incentive employer liability
creates is to avoid litigation by doing whatever it takes to appease the victim after the
incident. Prompt and effective remedial action may mollify some victims; others may
sue no matter what the employer does to remedy the situation.
Under the Court's rule, an employer easily could discourage employees from
complaining without incurring liability. The person in charge of receiving complaints
might say to an employee:
I can't promise you that the investigation will preserve your anonymity.
[This is a true statement.] Nor can I promise you that we'll discipline the
alleged harasser, because we might conclude that the allegations of
harassment aren't well-founded or that the incidents were so minor that
discipline is unwarranted. [This is also true and permissible.] Thus, it's
228 See, e.g., id. at 565 & n.I (citing Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the
Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1345
(1982); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategy and the Cost of Legal Controls,
93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517
(1980); Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate
Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1 (1980); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93
YALE L.J. 1231 (1984)).
[Vol. 7:3
CIVIL RIGHTS WITHOUT REMEDIES
possible that at the end of all this, you'll still be working for the person
whom you say harassed you, that he'll know you registered a complaint
against him, and that he'll hold a grudge against you. [This is also true.]
Now, an employee might well decide not to run the risk of poisoning a relationship
and possible retaliation (that could not be shown to violate Title VII's antiretaliation
provision). If she needs the job, she might decide it is better to endure the
harassment. If she later decides to sue, a court might find that her failure to initiate
a complaint was unreasonable, even if the harassment was egregious. Many cautious
plaintiffs' lawyers would decline to take a case on such facts.
Courts could adopt a rule of vicarious employer liability under Title VII for
sexual (and other forms of) harassment relying on the traditional agency principles
favored by the Supreme Court in Meritor, Ellerth, and Faragher by holding that Title
VII imposes a nondelegable duty to protect employees from harassment.229 As noted
above, Restatement (Second) of Agency section 219(2)(c) imposes liability on a
master for harms of a servant acting outside the scope of employment when the
master has a nondelegable duty to protect against such harms.230 Section 214 of the
Restatement defines the scope of that nondelegable duty as being "a duty to provide
protection for or to have care used to protect others or their property."23' Courts have
imposed such nondelegable duties on common carriers, ambulance services, hotels,
hospitals, facilities providing care for mentally disabled children, and employers with
respect to providing employees a safe workplace, among others.232
Nothing in the concept of the nondelegable duty doctrine itself identifies the
universe of harms for which employers should be held vicariously liable when their
employees are acting outside the scope of employment. The nondelegable duty
concept itself is essentially just a statement of a conclusion (of vicarious liability)
rather than a rule explaining when the conclusion is warranted. Moreover, state
courts are far from unanimous in their conclusions about when employers are
vicariously liable under the nondelegable duty rule. Nevertheless, Title VII, and
indeed, Section 1983 and Title IX too, fit the profile of the type of harm and the type
of victim that courts have considered worthy of vicarious employer liability under the
nondelegable duty concept:
229 See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986); Burlington Indus., Inc.
v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S.. Ct. 2275,
2285 (1998).
230 See supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text; I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 219(c) (1959).
231 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 214.
232 This nondelegable duty theory of vicarious liability is discussed infra notes 252-63 and
accompanying text.
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2. Vicarious Liability Serves the Purposes of Section 1983
The Court's justification for rejecting municipal liability under Section 1983 is
highly questionable. In Monell, the Court concluded that, although deterrence and
risk spreading would be served by allowing respondeat superior liability, the defeat
of the Sherman Amendment evidences a rejection of these policies.233 The Court's
error was in interpreting the legislative history of Section 1983 to answer a
question-When can municipalities be held liable for the actions of their
employees?-that it did not address. The Sherman Amendment, as discussed
earlier,3 would have made local governments liable for private acts of violence
within their territory. The defeat of the Sherman Amendment, however, as the Court
in Monell noted, was only a refusal to create an affirmative duty for cities to keep the
peace by making them monetarily liable for the actions of private citizens. 235 Just
because deterrence and risk spreading were not accepted as sufficient to justify
municipal liability for private actions does not mean that deterrence and risk
spreading were repudiated completely as underlying objectives of Section 1983.
In fact, two years after Monell, the Supreme Court held that municipalities do not
have good faith immunity under Section 1983 because such immunity would frustrate
the objectives of deterrence and risk spreading.236 In Owen v. City of Independence,
Missouri, the Court held that local governments are liable even when their
constitutional violations are a result of actions taken in good faith.237 In that case, a
city council fired the police chief without providing him any procedural due process
protections.23 The firing occurred shortly before the Supreme Court's major
procedural due process decisions established a right to protections under such
circumstances. 239 The city claimed immunity because its actions were taken in good
faith .240
The Court in Owen, however, held that the fact that city officials acted in good
faith did not protect a municipal government from liability under Section 1983.241
The Court emphasized that there was no indication in the legislative history that
Congress intended to accord municipal governments any form of immunity; in fact,
233 See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978).
234 See supra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
235 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 673.
236 See Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 650-52 (1980).
237 See id. at 624-30.
238 See id at 625-29.
239 See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972) (finding that due precess is required if a state
creates a liberty or property interest in a job).
240 See Owen, 445 U.S. at 634.
241 See id. at 650.
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local governments generally had no such immunity under the common law in 1871.242
Furthermore, the Court noted that to allow cities good faith immunity would frustrate
the deterrence and risk-spreading purposes of Section 1983.243 The Court rejected
the assertion that the absence of immunity would chill municipal officials' exercise
of their discretion.2" Because the individual officials had good faith immunity to
their personal liability, the existence of damage remedies against the municipality
should not have an adverse effect on government operations. The Court, however,
reasoned that allowing municipal liability would create an incentive for local
governments to prevent constitutional violations.24
It thus is clearly established that Section 1983 has as its primary goals deterrence
of civil rights violations and compensation of victims. This result is hardly
controversial; it is the classic reason for creating liability for infringements of rights,
whether common law, constitutional, or statutory. As explained earlier, vicarious
liability unquestionably serves these goals. Had the Court used a purposive analysis
to interpret Section 1983, respondeat superior liability would be imposed. A clear
and simple vicarious liability rule would be preferable to the current doctrinal
disarray involving literally thousands of decisions trying to define when cities can be
held liable. The underlying goals of Section 1983 would have been served best by
the Court's allowing vicarious liability.
3. Vicarious Liability Serves the Purposes of Title IX
The Court's rule that school districts are liable only in cases of actual notice and
deliberate indifference does not serve the two purposes of Title IX that the Court
identified when it created the private right of action in Cannon: "First, Congress
wanted to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices;
second, it wanted to provide individual citizens effective protection against those
practices. ' The Court thought that the first purpose "is generally served by the
statutory procedure for the termination of federal financial support," '247 but that the
funds cut-off procedure did not serve the second purpose because it was too
draconian to be used often and an inefficient and cumbersome response for an
isolated instance of discrimination.24 "The award of individual relief to a private
litigant who has prosecuted her own suit is not only sensible but is also fully
242 See id. at 638-39.
243 See id. at 65 1.
24 See id. at 650-51.
245 See id. at 651-52.
246 Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
247 Id.
248 See id. at 705.
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consistent with-and in some cases even necessary to-the orderly enforcement of
the statute.2 49
Established precedent from the law of agency used in tort cases supports
vicarious liability. The general rule is usually stated as providing for employer
liability for the tortious conduct of their employees only when the employer is itself
at fault or when the employee acted within the scope of employment. A tort, even
if intentional, is within the scope of employment if it has some (however misguided)
aspect of serving the master's purpose. Courts also hold employers vicariously
liable for the torts of employees that are motivated entirely by personal concerns
when the employer "by contract or otherwise, has entered into some relation
requiring him to be responsible for the protection of the plaintiff."25 ' The
Restatement (Second) ofAgency articulates this concept as one when the employer
owes a "nondelegable" duty. 252 The nondelegable duty concept makes common
carriers, an in some cases, hospitals, inkeepers, and schools vicariously liable for
their employees' intentional and negligent torts committed outside the scope of
employment against passengers, patients, guests, and students.
253
The rationale for the nondelegable duty doctrine, when it does not flow from an
express contract between the plaintiff and the employer, is that the plaintiff was
entirely in the control of the defendant and is especially vulnerable to harm.254 Title
IX seems to define the quintessential circumstance in which the employer has a
nondelegable duty, in the language of the Restatement, to provide a learning
249 Id. at 705-06.
250 See KEETON ETAL., supra note 12, at 505.
251 Id. at 506 (citations omitted).
252 See I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 214, 219(2)(c) (1959).
253 See, e.g., Gilstrap v. Amtrak, 998 F.2d 559, 561-62 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying
Washington law, the court found the railroad vicariously liable for sexual assault of
passenger by an employee of the railroad); Nazareth v. Hemdon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 467
So. 2d 1076, 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (holding ambulance service vicariously liable
for the sexual assault of a patient by an ambulance attendant); Eversole v. Wasson, 398
N.E.2d 1246, 1247-48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (finding a school vicariously liable for an assault
by a teacher of a student that resulted from a personal and nonschool-related dispute);
Stropes v. Heritage House Children's Ctr., 547 N.E.2d 244, 253-54 (Ind. 1989) (ruling that
a long-term care facility was vicariously liable for the sexual assault of a minor
patient/resident by a nurse's aide); cf California Ass'n of Health Facilities v. Department of
Health Servs., 940 P.2d 323, 332, 335 (Cal. 1997) (interpreting a statute regarding licensing
of long-term care facilities); Robinson v. Washington County, 529 A.2d 1357, 1361-62 (Me.
1987) (determining that a jail may be vicariously liable for an injury to a pretrial detainee
caused by the denial of necessary medical care); St. Michelle v. Catania, 250 A.2d 874, 878
(Md. 1969) (holding a taxicab company vicariously liable for the sexual assault and robbery
of a passenger by a cab driver employed by the company); Carabba v. Anacortes Sch. Dist.
No. 103, 435 P.2d 936, 948 (Wash. 1968) (finding a school vicariously liable for injuries
caused due to the negligence of a referee during a school-sponsored wrestling match).
254 See sources cited supra note 253.
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environment free from sexual harassment and abuse. The case law discussing
nondelegable duty stresses that the duty arises from a special relationship between
the offender's employer and the victim.."'
If ever there were a "special relationship" deserving of legal recognition, it must
be the relationship between a school and the children entrusted to its care. School
children are at the mercy of the schools in a way that employees and most other
victims of discrimination are not.256 A student who is victimized by discrimination
by school employees does not have the option employees do, as Justice Souter said
in Faragher, of"walk[ing] away or tell[ing] the offender where to go." '257 Students
cannot quit school, they cannot refuse to attend class, and they cannot tell their
teachers "where to go." Although they can tell harassing classmates "where to go,"
if words alone are ineffective to stop the harassment, or if the students are too
intimidated, they cannot distance themselves from harassing classmates by switching
classes or transferring themselves to another school.5  Indeed, in one case, the
victim of peer harassment was not even permitted to switch seats in the classroom.
She was forced to sit next to her harasser for months.25 9 The Court's holding in
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District 60 essentially says that schools
usually are not responsible for the harms students suffer at school. This holding is
astounding given that the victims of the harm are children and that the law requires
them to spend most of their waking hours in the school's care.
Thejurisdictions that have declined to recognize the nondelegable duty doctrine,
or that have declined to extend it to schools, group homes or hospitals, have
questioned the usefulness of the notion of special vulnerability in differentiating
among cases in which the employer ought to be held vicariously liable for the
personal torts of employees from those in which courts impose liability because the
employee acted within the scope of employment or because the employer was itself
at fault.26' While the notion of special vulnerability may be problematic with respect
255 See sources cited supra note 253.
256 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1193 (1 1th Cir. 1996), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288,
1292-93 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
257 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 229.1 (1998).
258 This has been the rationale for holding police departments vicariously liable for sexual
assaults committed by on-duty officers. As the court reasoned, "[a] police officer is-entrusted
with a great deal of authority.... The officer is supplied with a conspicuous automobile, a
badge and a gun to ensure immediate compliance with his directions." White v. County of
Orange, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493, 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). But cf John R. v. Oakland Unified
Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 956-57 (Cal. 1989) (holding a school not liable for teacher's
molestation of student because, in part, the "teacher's authority is different in both degree and
kind" from a police officer's authority).
259 See Davis, 74 F.3d at 1189.
260 118 S. Ct. 2000 (1998).
261 See, e.g., Kennel v. Carson City Sch. Dist., 738 F. Supp. 376, 379 (D. Nev. 1990)
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to common carriers,262 it does usefully distinguish schools or hospitals that are
responsible for the care of children from all other types of employers.263 Minor
students are vulnerable in ways that no other tort victims are. In this respect, the
rationales the Court offered in Ellerth and Faragher for insulating an employer from
liability if the victim fails to complain-the duty of victims to minimize harm and the
desire to create incentives for employees to use employer-provided reporting
mechanisms to resolve problems without litigation--cannot seriously be applied to
children who are the victims of sexual harassment and abuse by teachers. Whatever
one may think reasonable for an employee to do when harassed-to overcome her
fears of retaliation, to be responsible about investigating how to register a complaint,
and to report it-would be unreasonable to expect from a child. It takes greater
resourcefulness and maturity than we should expect from children to identify certain
behavior as illegal sexual harassment and to report it.
(holding that school does not owe nondelegable duty to student intentionally injured by
another student during athletic event); Sebastian v. District of Columbia, 636 A.2d 958, 966
(D.D.C. 1994) (declining to recognize a nondelegable duty of liability of common carrier and
ruling that ambulance service was not liable for sexual assault committed by ambulance
attendant outside scope of employment); Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc.,
558 N.E.2d 958, 968 (Mass. 1990) (finding group day school for mentally disabled not liable
for sexual assault of minor); Maguire v. State, 835 P.2d 755, 758-59 (Mont. 1992) (declining
to hold state hospital liable under nondelegable duty doctrine for sexual assault of minor
patient by employee); Greening v. School Dist. of Millard, 393 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Neb. 1986)
(ruling that school does not owe a nondelegable duty to student injured by unlicensed
physical therapist employed by state); Adams v. New York City Transit Auth., 666 N.E.2d
216, 220 (N.Y. 1996) (declining to recognize a nondelegable duty of common carriers and,
thus, holding that transit authority is not liable for intentional tort by subway employee);
Comell v. State, 389 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (N.Y. 1979) (ruling that state hospital is not liable
under nondelegable doctrine for sexual assault of minor patient by attendant); Niece v.
Elmview Group Home, 929 P.2d 420, 428-31 (Wash. 1997) (holding group day school for
mentally disabled not liable for sexual assault); cf John R., 769 P.2d at 953-57 (finding
school not vicariously liable for a teacher's sexual assault of student because the incident
occurred outside the scope of employment; nondelegable duty doctrine not discussed);
Bratton v. Calkins, 870 P.2d 981, 986 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (ruling that school is not liable
for sexual assault of student by teacher which occurred outside the scope of employment).
262 See, e.g., Adams, 666 N.E.2d at 220 (finding a transit authority not liable for an
intentional tort committed by employee against a passenger).
263 Some courts, particularly in cases involving school liability for teachers' sexual
assaults, have rejected employer liability because they thought it would shift scarce resources
away from other students to the victim and would shift resources away from education and
toward the purchase of insurance. See John R., 769 P.2d at 956. This proves too much, for
it really is an argument for rejecting vicarious employer liability in all cases, or at least in all
cases in which the employer is not at fault.
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
We propose that employers be held liable under respondeat superior, that is,
automatically liable without regard to employer fault, for all discrimination under
Title VII and all deprivations of civil rights under Section 1983. Schools should be
vicariously liable for all teacher harassment of students under Title IX and should be
liable on a fault basis fdr student harassment of students. This result would
significantly expand vicarious liability in civil rights cases. Furthermore, we propose
that the same standard advocated here for Title VII be applied to other employment
discrimination statutes, such as the ADEA and the ADA. The same standards we
propose for Title IX should be applied to race discrimination cases under Title VI.
In addition, the standard should be the same under Section 1981 as it is under Section
1983.
A. Title VII
We propose that employers be held strictly liable for all supervisory and
coworker sexual harassment, and for any other discriminatory conduct that violates
Title VII. The Supreme Court should abandon that part of the Meritor holding in
which it stated that employers are not "automatically" liable for supervisory sexual
harassment. It also should reject the position of the EEOC and federal courts of
appeals which hold that employers are liable for coworker harassment only if the
employer (a) did not have an adequate policy prohibiting harassment and procedure
for reporting harassment, or (b) failed to take prompt and effective remedial action
once it was aware of the harassment.
Vicarious liability would simplify Title VII litigation by eliminating the difficult
issues that have been created by the Court's different employer liability rules for
coworkers (fault-based; burden of proving fault on plaintiff), for supervisors who
cause an adverse employment action (vicarious liability), and for supervisors who
cause no adverse employment action (fault-based; burden of proving absence of fault
on employer). The Ellerth-Faragher rule requires the parties to litigate who is a
supervisor; it also requires the parties to litigate whether there was an adverse
employment action (did the victim freely quit or was she constructively discharged?).
Further, Ellerth and Faragher may create the bizarre situation that two employees
whose supervisor says "sleep with me or you're fired" will have different vicarious
liability rules depending on whether the victim tests the threat. The one who says no
and is fired can establish vicarious employer liability. The employee who, fearing
for her job, says yes and then later quits may not be able to establish vicarious
liability because she may have suffered no "adverse employment action." Unless
being forced to have sex or later quitting the job is an adverse employment action
chargeable to the employer, the employer could establish the affirmative defense that
it had a sexual harassment policy that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to use.
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B. Section 1983
Adoption of vicarious liability would be desirable under Section 1983.
Municipalities would be liable, under the same principles as other employers, for the
harms caused by their employees' violations of the Constitution and federal laws. At
the very least, this would greatly simplify the law. Currently, a plaintiff seeking to
prove municipal liability must show the existence of a municipal policy such as by
showing deliberate indifference in training or a decision by a person with final
decision-making authority or a custom that caused the violation.2" As Justice Breyer
recently noted, the law has become extraordinarily complex and has produced a body
of law "that is neither readily understandable nor easy to apply." '265 Allowing
vicarious liability for municipalities would eliminate the need for these complex tests
and replace them with the traditional tort law principles that are well-established and
vastly simpler.
Moreover, allowing local governments to be held vicariously liable for the acts
of their employees would advance the compensation and deterrence goals of Section
1983. Without municipal liability, injured individuals often cannot recover.
Individual officers, the other possible defendant, are protected by immunities-
sometimes absolute, otherwise qualified-that often make recovery impossible.266
Local governments, in contrast, are not accorded such immunities.267 Even when
individual officers cannot succeed with an immunity defense, they are unlikely to
have the resources to pay a judgment. The deeper pockets of municipalities
tremendously increase the likelihood that an injured person will be compensated.
Vicarious liability also gives municipalities a greater incentive to monitor,
supervise, and control the acts of their employees. Local governments, with
inherently scarce resources, obviously want to minimize the amount of their budget
that is lost to paying damages. Therefore, with vicarious liability, they have a
significant reason to prevent violations from occurring.
C. Title IX
For all the same reasons that school districts should be strictly liable for teacher
sexual harassment of students, schools should be held liable for pupil-on-pupil
harassment on the basis of negligence. Title IX guarantees students a learning
264 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 478-88 (3d ed. 1999) (describing
ways of establishing municipal liability).
265 Board of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,431 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
266 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 264, at 500-22 (describing absolute and qualified
immunity).
267 See Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 638-50 (1980) (holding that
local governments do not have immunity in Section 1983 suits).
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environment free from sex discrimination. Rampant and unremedied sexual
harassment by students can interfere with the equal educational opportunity as
seriously as can sexual harassment by teachers.
Schools cannot credibly claim that they are unable to prevent or remedy sexual
harassment by students of which they are made aware. Students accused of
harassment can be disciplined, transferred, suspended, or expelled from school.
Alternatively, victims of harassment can be transferred.
The more compelling argument against strict liability for pupil-on-pupil
harassment is that it is more difficult to detect and prevent. Public schools have more
students than employees, they cannot screen students before allowing them into the
school, and they cannot choose which students to admit.
Vicarious liability for schools is essential to create the necessary incentives for
the institutions to act to prevent and remedy sexual harassment by students of other
students. Indeed, if the Supreme Court, in dealing with peer harassment, follows the
same approach as it used in Gebser in dealing with teacher harassment, it would give
schools every incentive to avoid gaining knowledge of problems. Under Gebser, a
school district is liable only if it has actual knowledge and is deliberately indifferent.
Therefore, a school district that remains ignorant of sexual harassment never is liable.
Dealing with sexual harassment, especially by students, often will require schools
to take the initiative to uncover the problem. The Gebser approach gives schools
every reason not to do so. The preferable approach is to hold schools liable if they
knew or should have known of the harassing behavior. Much of what occurs
between students is simply unknowable to teachers and administrators. Schools
should have an incentive to investigate when they have information that justifies
action, but it would not serve the goals of Title IX to hold schools liable in
circumstances where they have no reason to suspect a problem. Thus, notice
liability-creating liability where the school knew or should have known-is
preferable to strict liability, and certainly better than the Gebser approach.
D. Individual Liability
An additional benefit of automatic employer liability would be the elimination
of the need for individual liability. This rule would simplify litigation of
discrimination suits.268 It would eliminate the confusion and conflict in current law
268 The majority of courts that have considered the issue of individual liability have held
that individuals cannot be sued under Title IX for sexual harassment. See Bustos v. Illinois
Inst. of Cosmetology, Inc., No. 93 C 5980, 1994 WL 710830, at *2 (N.D. I11. Dec. 15, 1994)
(mem.) ("Thus, the goal of Title IX is to prevent institutional discrimination; consequently,
the implied right of action created by Title IX extends only to institutional actors.");
Slaughter v. Waubonsee Community College, No. 94 C 2525, 1994 WL 663596, at *2-*3
(N.D. I11. Nov. 18, 1994) (mem.) (dismissing action against college professor for quid pro
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as to whether individual harassers can be sued under Title VII and other employment
discrimination statutes.269 There exists additional uncertainty as to whether, if an
individual is liable under Title VII, the employer has a duty to defend and indemnify
the individual defendant. When a victim of discrimination sues, she is likely to sue
both the employer and one or more individuals. The employer (or, as is increasingly
likely, the employer's insurer) must decide whether to defend and indemnify the
individual defendant. Often, the employer and the individual defendant may have
conflicting interests, and joint representation presents serious conflict of interest
quo sexual harassment on the basis that only institutions may be sued under Title IX); Aurelia
D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363, 367 (M.D. Ga. 1994), modified sub
noma. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (dismissing
plaintiff's claims against individuals under Title IX because only federally funded institutions
can be held liable under that statute); Garza v. Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp.
1437, 1438 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (dismissing a Title IX claim against individual defendants);
Saville v. Houston County Healthcare Auth., 852 F. Supp. 1512, 1522-25 (M.D. Ala. 1994)
(dismissing Title IX Claims against an individual through analysis of claim under Title VII
law); Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1116 (D. Utah 1994) (dismissing claims against
individual defendants because neither was an "education program or activity" within the
meaning of the statute); Hastings v. Hancock, 842 F. Supp. 1315, 1317 (D. Kan. 1993)
(noting that an educational institution is the proper defendant in a Title IX action).
One court has held that individuals may not be defendants under Title VI. See Jackson
v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F. Supp. 1293, 1298 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
The Supreme Court's decisions in Gebser and Franklin left open the possibility of
individual liability in Title IX cases. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct.
1989, 1994-96 (1998); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 68-71 (1992).
But the standard for individual liability, if such liability exists, is almost certainly the same
actual notice plus deliberate indifference standard for institutional liability.
This raises the question whether victims of harassment are better off suing the
individuals under Section 1983. One commentator has suggested:
a plaintiff may find it easier to prove that the principal, superintendent, or school
district were responsible for a teacher's misconduct under Section 1983, which
generally requires a showing of gross negligence, than under Title IX, which
requires a showing of actual knowledge plus a deliberate indifference on the part
of supervisory officials and institutions.
Michael A. Zwibelman, Comment, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude Section 1983 Claims,
65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465, 1466-67 (1998). But this commentator noted that the lower courts
are in conflict as to whether the existence of a claim under Title IX precludes any claim under
Section 1983. See id at 1465.
Individual government officials can be sued in their personal capacity for monetary
damages, although not for certain other kinds of relief. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.,
491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989); John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and
Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 65-66 (1998). For a discussion on personal liability under
Section 1983 in sexual harassment cases, see generally Cheryl L. Anderson, "Nothing
Personal:" Individual Liability Under 42 US.C. § 1983for Sexual Harassment As an Equal
Protection Claim, 19 BERK. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 60 (1998).
269 See supra note 50.
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questions. At times, separate representation may be necessary or advisable. If the
employer declines to defend the individual defendant, the risk of litigation over that
decision arises as well. All of this may be good news for lawyers, but it is bad news
for discrimination victims, bad news for employers, and a waste of all parties'
resources.
Creating respondeat superior liability for civil rights violations would eliminate,
or at least greatly reduce, the pressure to create individual liability. The drive to
establish individual liability is motivated in large part by plaintiffs seeking full
recovery when the absence of vicarious liability poses the risk that the employer may
not be liable. Individual liability can complicate the relationship of the employer to
its supervisory employees who may be potential defendants.
CONCLUSION
Over the past decade, there has been almost unprecedented attention to the
method of statutory interpretation. Coincidentally, the law of sexual harassment has
developed during this same time. Not surprisingly, in deciding important issues
regarding the law of sexual harassment, questions of interpretive methodology have
arisen. The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, and Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District all turn on interpreting civil rights laws to determine whether vicarious
liability should be allowed.
The Court's approach to vicarious liability under major civil rights laws has
varied. The Court has accepted limited vicarious liability under Title VII, but
rejected it under Title IX and Section 1983. Yet, nothing in the statutory language
or legislative history of these laws justifies the differences in the Court's treatment
of respondeat superior liability under these statutes.
The preferable approach would be for the Court to interpret these civil rights
statutes to further the underlying goals that they were meant to achieve: deterrence
of violations of civil rights and compensation for injuries. The tort law long has
recognized that vicarious liability is a crucial tool for attaining deterrence and
compensation. Holding employers liable for their employees actions creates an
incentive for employers to prevent wrongful conduct. Additionally, employers are
much more likely to have the resources to pay damage judgments than individual
employees.
Thus, our conclusion is that the standard for vicarious liability should be the
same under Title VII, Title IX , and Section 1983. Under each statute, the Court
should allow vicarious liability of employers to further the underlying goals for the
statutes.
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